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Using survey-based measures of future U.S. economic activity from the Liv-
ingston Survey and the Survey of Professional Forecasters, we study how
c h a n g e si ne x p e c t a t i o n s ,a n dt h e i ri n t e r a c t i o nw i t hm o n e t a r yp o l i c y ,c o n -
tribute to ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic aggregates. We ﬁnd that changes
in expected future economic activity are a quantitatively important driver of
economic ﬂuctuations: a perception that good times are ahead typically leads
t oas i g n i ﬁcant rise in current measures of economic activity and inﬂation.
We also ﬁnd that the short-term interest rate rises in response to expectations
of good times as monetary policy tightens. Our results provide quantitative
evidence on the importance of expectations-driven business cycles and on the
role that monetary policy plays in shaping them.
JEL classiﬁcation:
Keywords: Expectations, survey data, economic ﬂuctuations1 Introduction
The idea that changes in expectations of future economic activity can be
important drivers of economic ﬂuctuations has received increased attention
with the unfolding of boom-bust cycles around the world over the past 20
years. The experiences of Japan in the late 1980s, East Asia in the late 1990s,
and the United States in 2001 and 2007 suggest that optimism about future
growth prospects may help fuel booms and that subsequent downward revi-
sions in expectations may help precipitate busts. In addition, these episodes
have served to generate debate about the importance of the role played by
monetary policy in boom-bust cycles: the episodes were often accompanied
by heightened criticism of central banks for fueling the booms by keeping
monetary policy too easy for too long.1
Although boom-bust cycles are interesting events that suggest the im-
portance of expectations for economic ﬂuctuations, there has been relatively
little empirical analysis that attempts to formally quantify the role played by
expectations for the cyclical behavior of the economy. In this paper, we add to
this literature by introducing survey-based measures of future U.S. economic
activity into simple empirical models to measure how changes in expecta-
tions, and their interaction with monetary policy, contribute to ﬂuctuations
1For instance, see Taylor (2008) for a criticism of the Federal Reserve’s policies under
Chairmen Greenspan and Bernanke, and Lionel Robbin’s (1934) argument that the Federal
Reserve kept interest rates below the natural rate for too long during the late 1920s. See
also Okina et al (2001) concerning reasons that Japanese monetary policy may have been
too loose in the period leading up to the burst of the stock-market bubble at the beginning
of 1990.
1in macroeconomic aggregates. We take expectations measures compiled by
the Livingston Survey and the Survey of Professional Forecasters and intro-
duce them into an otherwise conventional vector autoregression framework.
Survey data remain relatively unused in empirical work on economic ﬂuctu-
ations, despite the fact that surveys are closely monitored by policymakers,
who view them as important indicators of market participants’ perceptions of
future economic activity. A beneﬁt of using survey data is that they provide
an independent source of information about agents’ perceptions of future eco-
nomic activity. Consequently, one need not impose modeling assumptions to
back out those expectations.
We exploit the timing of the surveys’ construction to help identify struc-
tural shocks to expectations. To circumvent diﬃcult issues surrounding the
use of ex post revised data in assessing the quantitative role of changes in
expectations, our VARs are estimated using data that are not subject to re-
vision over time. In particular, we use the unemployment rate as a measure
of economic activity.
Our main ﬁnding is that changes in expected future economic activity are
a quantitatively important driver of economic ﬂuctuations: a perception that
good times are ahead typically leads to a signiﬁcant rise in current measures
of real economic activity and inﬂation. In response, the short-term interest
rate rises as monetary policy tightens. The results are robust across the two
surveys and to the inclusion of diﬀerent forward-looking ﬁnancial variables in
the empirical models. Moreover, we show that our results are substantively
unchanged when we measure expectations using data from the University of
Michigan survey of households rather than survey measures from professional
2forecasters. Although the Michigan survey asks respondents only whether
they expect the unemployment rate to go up, down, or stay unchanged, it
remains an important check on our ﬁndings, since the coverage of the survey
is much more extensive.
Our results shed some light on the role played by monetary policy in
fueling boom episodes in the U.S. The conventional wisdom, as embodied
in Bernanke and Gertler (2000), is that an inﬂation-targeting central bank
will naturally act as a stabilizing force with respect to boom-bust cycles as
it contracts monetary policy in response to factors that raise expected inﬂa-
tion and lower output gaps. In contrast, Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno
(2006) point out that this need not be the case if nominal wages are sticky.
Expectations of higher future productivity growth put upward pressure on
the real wage. To the extent that the nominal wage is sticky, this is necessar-
ily accomplished by a fall in prices, to which an inﬂation- targeting central
bank responds by lowering the short-term nominal interest rate, thus feeding
the boom. Our empirical results are more consistent with the conventional
view: upward revisions to expectations about future economic performance
are accompanied by a rise in current activity and inﬂation, and a concomi-
tant rise in the short-term interest rate, which tends to stabilize the economy.
Though our ﬁndings are not derived exclusively from boom-bust episodes in
the data, they nevertheless suggest that during times of "economic optimism"
the Federal Reserve tended not to run an expansionary monetary policy that
ampliﬁed ﬂuctuations.2
2Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2006) focus their analysis solely on boom-bust
episodes, of which they identify three over the period 1870 to 2006: one that began in
1920 and ended at the start of the Great Depression, one that began in the mid 1950s and
3Our ﬁndings are somewhat at odds with the predictions of the standard
neo-classical business cycle model. In that model, expectations that good
times are ahead, usually modeled as an anticipated increase in productivity,
lead to a current period recession, as the positive wealth eﬀect of the antic-
ipated productivity increase induces an increase in leisure today. However,
the standard model can be modiﬁed so that expectations of good times can
generate business cycle booms, as shown by Beaudry and Portier (2006,2007),
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2006), and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009).
Typically, the modiﬁcation involves adding complementarities in the pro-
duction technology or adding certain types of adjustment costs, of which a
labor-matching friction would be an example.
Indeed, our ﬁnding that the economy expands in response to an upward
revision in expectations of future activity squares well with the predictions
of standard labor matching models with respect to the impact of changes
in expectations. In that framework, expectations that good times are ahead
increase the marginal beneﬁto fam a t c ha n dl e a dt oaf a l li nt h ec u r r e n t
u n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea sm o r ev a c a n c i e sa r eb e i n gp o s t e d .S t u d y i n gt h ee ﬀects
o fa na n t i c i p a t e di n c r e a s ei np r o d u c t i v i t yi nal a b o rs e a r c hm o d e l ,d e nH a a n
and Kaltenbrunner (2009) ﬁnd that it induces entrepreneurs to increase in-
vestment in new projects and post vacancies early and so induce an economic
expansion.
Our empirical analysis is not geared to identifying speciﬁc factors that
map into expectations shocks. Nonetheless, our view is that such factors are
likely to include news revelations about future economic developments, the
ended in the 1970s, and one that began in the mid 1990s and ended in the early 2000s.
4possibility of future labor strikes, new technological developments, or pre-
announced monetary policy actions, etc. that are observed by survey partic-
ipants, but that are diﬃcult to adequately capture in a small-scale VAR. The
e m p i r i c a lo fw o r ko fB e a u d r ya n dP o r tier (2006) suggests that such "news
shocks” explain about 50 percent of business cycle ﬂuctuations. Similarly,
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2008) estimate the contribution of news shocks
to business cycles in a real business cycle model and ﬁnd that anticipated
shocks account for close to 70 percent of aggregate ﬂuctuations.3 Similarly,
our estimates suggest a quantitatively important role for expectations shocks
in economic ﬂuctuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the base-
line VAR and how we measure expectations and economic activity. Sections
3 and 4 then present empirical results on the baseline model and some ex-
tensions to the baseline. Section 5 investigates the robustness of the results,
and Section 6 concludes.
2 A Small Structural VAR
We are interested in quantifying the extent to which changes in agents’ ex-
pectations about the future may aﬀect current economic variables. To mea-
sure expectations we use data from two sources: the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) and the Livingston Survey (LS). Both surveys collect pre-
3On the other hand, Sims (2008) uses a diﬀerent identiﬁcation scheme in a larger-
scale VAR and argues that shocks to expectations about future productivity are not an
important source of business cycles and that the responses to such shocks are similar to
what is predicted by the standard real business cycle model.
5dictions from professional forecasters (typically about 40 to 50 respondents
per survey) and both are conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia. The SPF is a quarterly survey that dates from 1968, at which time
it was conducted by the American Statistical Association and the National
Bureau of Economic Research (the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
took over the survey in 1990). The SPF is released at the end of the second
month of each quarter (or early in the next month). Survey participants pro-
vide forecasts of variables such as CPI inﬂation, the unemployment rate, real
GDP growth, and nonfarm payroll growth over a 5- quarter horizon. The LS,
which was initiated in 1946, is conducted twice a year. Survey questionnaires
go out in May and November and the survey’s results are made public in the
second week of June and December. The survey started compiling forecasts
of the unemployment rate in 1961 and it covers a somewhat broader set of
macroeconomic variables than the SPF.
W eu s es u r v e yf o r e c a s t so ft h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t et op r o x ye x p e c t a t i o n s
about future economic activity. The unemployment rate has the advantage
that it is subject to only minor revisions, which are limited to changes in
seasonal factors. By using forecasts of the unemployment rate we can bypass
diﬃcult questions about real-time data and subsequent data revisions. For
example, the use of expected and actual real GDP growth (measured using
the latest vintage of data) in our VARs would be problematic because real
GDP revisions may incorporate information that is unavailable to forecasters
at the time their forecasts were being made. Since the unemployment rate
series is unrevised, we can include expected and actual unemployment in
a VAR and not otherwise have to account for the possibility that the VAR
6conditioning set contains more information than forecasters had when making
their predictions.
Figure 1 shows the 2-quarter-ahead SPF forecast of the unemployment
rate and the realized unemployment rate. Forecasters were able to predict
the unemployment rate reasonably well, notwithstanding its large increase
to more than 10 percent in 1982 from 4 percent in the early 1970s, and its
quick decline coming out of the 1981-82 recession.4 Overall, there doesn’t
appear to be a systematic bias in the unemployment rate forecasts. This is
in contrast to inﬂation forecasts, which tended to be consistently below the
inﬂation rate during the inﬂation runup in the 1970s and consistently above
the inﬂation rate during the Volcker disinﬂation of the early 1980s (see, for
instance, the discussion in Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007)).
We ﬁrst consider the implications of a baseline VAR model composed of
the 6-month-ahead expected unemployment rate, the realized unemployment
rate, the realized CPI inﬂation rate, and the realized nominal 3-month Trea-
sury bill rate.5 The key speciﬁcation issue for investigating the consequences
of shifts in expectations is how to identify expectations shocks. We use a
recursive identiﬁcation scheme that places the expected unemployment rate
ﬁrst in the ordering, followed by the actual unemployment rate, CPI inﬂa-
tion, and the nominal interest rate. Consequently, this ordering assumes that
there is no contemporaneous response of expected unemployment to shocks
to the other variables in the system.
4A similar picture emerges for longer-horizon forecasts and for forecasts from the Liv-
ingston survey.
5Note that the CPI index is generally not revised over time nor is the measured Treasury
bill rate.
7Following Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007), the placement of expected unem-
ployment ﬁrst in the recursive identiﬁcation is motivated by the timing of the
surveys and the way we have aligned the other data in the VAR. The timing
of the survey is critical in that it allows us to put expected unemployment
ﬁrst, since when making forecasts at time t, the information set on which
agents condition their forecasts does not include, by construction, the time
t realizations of the unemployment rate and the other variables in our VAR.
To elaborate, take the case of the SPF. The response deadline is generally
the third week of the second month of the quarter (although the deadline does
vary a bit over the survey sample period).6 Based on the survey’s timing,
we redeﬁne quarters of the year so that the ﬁrst month of a quarter is the
month that survey responses are ﬁlled out. Thus, the redeﬁned ﬁrst quarter
is February, March, April. The second quarter becomes May, June, July, and
so on. With this timing convention and associated data deﬁnition, the SPF is
by construction conducted at the start( g e n e r a l l yt h es e c o n do rt h i r dw e e k )
of each quarter. Consequently, the data are aligned so that agents have
past values of the unemployment rate, inﬂation and interest rates in their
information set when the surveys are ﬁlled out, but they do not yet have
the oﬃcial data releases telling them contemporaneous quarter values of the
u n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea n di n ﬂation. However, they do have some information
on quarterly interest rates (the ﬁr s tt w oo rt h r e ew e e k so ft h eq u a r t e r l y
realization).
6For example, in 1995 the Q1 SPF respondents had to return the survey questionnaire
by February 21. For the 1995Q2, survey responses were due by May 22. For 1995Q3,
survey responses were due by August 22, and for 1995Q4 survey responses were due by
November 20.
8We employ a similar strategy when constructing the data set for the VARs
that use the Livingston Survey measure of expectations. Now, half-years are
deﬁned based on the timing of the Livingston Survey to mitigate the inﬂuence
that contemporaneous realizations of the unemployment rate, inﬂation, and
interest rates can have on forecasters’ decisions about future unemployment
rates. Since in this case the survey questionnaire is due back in May and
November, we redeﬁne half-years as running from April to October and from
October to April. As with the SPF, this data alignment implies that the
survey is conducted at the start of each period: May and November. The
remaining variables in the VAR are then measured as the average monthly
value of the corresponding six-month period.
It could of course be the case that agents condition their forecasts on
variables that are omitted from the VAR and which provide important in-
formation about the within-period realization of the unemployment rate,
interest rates, and inﬂation. We address this concern by expanding the set
of variables in the baseline VAR to include additional ﬁnancial market vari-
ables that are likely to be inﬂuenced by potentially important omitted vari-
ables. In addition, we introduce further controls for oil and ﬁscal policy
shocks. As shown below, these modiﬁcations of the baseline structure do not
qualitatively change the results (though there is some small change in the
quantitative responses).
T os u m m a r i z et h e n ,t h eb a s e l i n eV A R sc o n t a i nf o u rd y n a m i cv a r i a b l e s
and use a recursive identiﬁcation scheme that orders expectation variables
ﬁrst. The variables are ordered as the expected unemployment rate, the
unemployment rate, inﬂation, and the nominal interest rate. The data used
9in the VAR are largely unrevised over time, and the deﬁnitions of quarters
or half-years and the measurements of quarterly and biannual realizations
are consistent with placing the expectations variable above the other model
variables in the recursive ordering. We now turn to an analysis of the baseline
VAR results.
3 Results from a Baseline VAR
Our interest focuses on the economy’s response to an unanticipated shock to
expectations of the future unemployment rate. We interpret a shock to the
expected unemployment rate as news received by agents that leads them to
reassess their beliefs regarding future prospects for the economy. A negative
shock to the expected unemployment rate (i.e., lower expected unemploy-
ment) then has the interpretation of news that agents get at the start of a
quarter that leads them to become more optimistic about future economic
conditions. The models are estimated over the sample period 1961H1 to
2007H1 for the Livingston Survey VAR (because the LS is biannual, we de-
note the ﬁrst survey observation in a year as H1) and 1968Q4-2007Q2 for the
S P FV A R .F o ro u rb a s e l i n er e s u l t s ,w ee n d e dt h es a m p l eb e f o r et h eo n s e t
of the current ﬁnancial crisis. We did this to avoid misspeciﬁcation issues
related to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and to the uncon-
ventional tools used to conduct monetary policy over the post-2007 period.
However, we verify that similar results obtain when post-2007 data are in-
cluded in the sample.
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses to a normalized one unit negative
10shock to the 6-month-ahead expected unemployment rate for the baseline
VARs. The panel on the left shows the impulses from a VAR that uses
the Livingston Survey measure of expectations, while the panel on the right
shows the responses from a VAR that uses the SPF expectations measure.
Each panel of the ﬁgure shows the response of a variable to the expectations
shock, as well as 68 and 90 percent conﬁdence intervals that are generated
using Kilian’s (1998) bootstrap-within-bootstrap method.
On impact, a negative innovation to the expected unemployment rate six
months ahead leads to a fall in the current unemployment rate, an increase
in inﬂation, and an increase in the 3-month Treasury bill rate. All responses
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 90 percent conﬁdence level. The
unemployment rate is signiﬁcantly below zero for about 2 years, while the
increase in the nominal interest rate is signiﬁcant for 2 to 3 years. The rise in
inﬂation is somewhat more signiﬁcant and persistent in the Livingston VAR
than in the SPF VAR. Expected unemployment is quite persistent, staying
signiﬁcantly below zero for roughly 2 years.
The two VARs largely tell the same story. Unexpected good news that
leads agents to revise down their forecasts for future unemployment rates
brings about a current boom in economic activity and a concomitant tight-
ening of monetary policy. Note that while the implied short-term real interest
rate falls slightly on impact, it is rising and above zero by the second period
after the shock and so is consistent with a somewhat delayed policy tight-
ening. On balance, the estimated monetary policy response to a news shock
supports the story in Bernanke and Gertler (2000). More optimistic expec-
tations of a future boom (in the form of a lower future unemployment rate)
11coincide with an anticipatory monetary policy tightening. In this respect,
the baseline speciﬁcation suggests that, on average, monetary policy over
the sample period did not serve to amplify expectations-driven ﬂuctuations.
Rather, policymakers appear to have responded to anticipated booms and
the concomitant higher near-term inﬂation by raising the short-term inter-
est rate. The response is consistent with the view that a monetary policy
that responds aggressively to changes in inﬂation serves to dampen economic
ﬂuctuations.
The ﬁnding that expectations of good times in the future lead to good
times today is consistent with the view in Beaudry and Portier (2006), Den
Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009), and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). These
authors argue that upward revisions to expectations of future productivity
growth can lead to business cycle booms in suitably modiﬁed business cycle
models. While our VAR-based ﬁndings do not provide direct evidence on
the eﬀects of revisions to expected productivity growth, the movement in the
VAR’s unemployment rate in response to revisions to expectations of future
activity is qualitatively consistent with the hours/unemployment dynamic
response in the aforesaid papers.7
3.1 Controlling for Fiscal Policy and Oil Shocks
To accurately assess the role of expectations shocks for economic ﬂuctua-
tions it is important to control for shocks that may play a signiﬁcant role in
7Since 1991, the SPF asks survey respondents about their expectations of productivity
growth 10 years out. However, the question is asked only in the ﬁrst quarter of each year
and so leaves us relatively few data points to conduct a meaningful analysis.
12the system’s dynamic behavior. Two obvious candidates for such shocks are
oil price movements and ﬁscal stimulus/contractions. There is evidence that
large upward movements in oil prices are associated with economic downturns
(see Hamilton (2003) and the references therein). To control for exogenous,
unanticipated increases in oil prices, we employ the quantitative dummy
variable developed by Hamilton (2003). The quantitative dummy variable
captures the disruptions in the oil market due to political events in the Mid-
dle East that are plausibly exogenous to developments in the U.S. economy.
Hamilton identiﬁes the following dates as being associated with exogenous
declines (in parenthesis) in world oil supply: November 1956 (10.1%), Novem-
ber 1973 (7.8%), December 1978 (8.9%), October 1980 (7.2%), and August
1990 (8.8%). Three of these episodes fall within the sample period of our
baseline model: December 1978, October 1980, and August 1990. The quan-
titative dummy takes a value equal to the drop in world production during
the period in which the episodes occur and is otherwise zero.
To identify exogenous ﬁscal shocks, we appeal to the narrative approach of
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and its extension in Ramey (2009). They identify
four exogenous ﬁscal shocks in the postwar U.S. data: 1950Q3, associated
with the Korean War; 1965Q1, associated with the Vietnam War; 1980Q1
associated with the Carter-Reagan military buildup; and 2001:Q3, associated
with terrorist attack on September 11. Of these shocks, only the 1980Q1 and
2001Q3 episodes fall within our estimation period.
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses to an innovation in the expected
unemployment rate in the baseline VARs that have been modiﬁed to include
the oil and ﬁscal dummy variables (we maintain the same recursive ordering
13as in Figure 2). Comparing the impulse responses to those in Figure 2,
controlling for exogenous oil and ﬁscal shocks has little eﬀect on the dynamic
response of the unemployment rate, inﬂation, and the nominal interest rate.
It remains the case that a fall in the expected unemployment rate leads to
a contemporaneous decline in the current unemployment rate, a rise in the
inﬂation rate, and an increase in the short-term interest rate.
4 Extending the Baseline Model
It is conceivable that the expectations shocks in the VAR models are contam-
inated by omitted variables that convey important information to forecasters
about the current and future states of the economy. To mitigate this empiri-
cal concern we add additional ﬁnancial variables to the baseline VARs: stock
returns as measured by the S&P500 and long-term bond returns as measured
by the yield on ten-year Treasury notes. Presumably, important news about
the future economy would be reﬂe c t e di ns u c hﬁnancial asset prices and so
conditioning on them is a straightforward, although somewhat crude, way to
add omitted information to the VAR analysis. The ﬁnancial data enter the
VARs as period averages of daily data. Consequently, news that arrives in
t h et i m ei n t e r v a lb e t w e e nt h el a s to b s e r v a t i o no fav a r i a b l ea n dt h ed a t eo f
t h es u r v e yc a np o t e n t i a l l ya ﬀect ﬁnancial asset prices and be reﬂe c t e di nt h e
VARs, so the measure is not without some concern vis-à-vis the identiﬁcation
assumption.
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to an expectations shock in the
baseline VARs augmented by the equity return and long bond yield series.
14We again use a recursive identiﬁcation scheme with the variables ordered as:
expected unemployment rate, unemployment rate, inﬂation, equity returns,
long-term interest rate, and fed funds rate. The responses for the unem-
ployment rate and inﬂation are similar to those in Figures 2 and 3. Equity
returns (Q) and long-term interest rates (LR) increase in response to a neg-
ative innovation to unemployment rate expectations, and both responses are
signiﬁcant on impact in the VAR that uses the Livingston Survey measure
of expectations. The equity return response is only marginally signiﬁcant in
the VAR that uses the SPF expectations measure. The federal funds rate
response is somewhat weaker on impact in Figure 4 compared to the VARs
without equity returns and long-term interest rates, but continues to show a
signiﬁcant monetary policy tightening in response to expectations of a lower
unemployment rate. On balance, the addition of the ﬁnancial market vari-
ables does not change much the qualitative or quantitative results from the
baseline VAR in Figure 2.
4.1 Variance Decompositions and Prediction
The importance of innovations to expectations for the dynamics of the VAR
system is indicated as well by variance decompositions. Table 1 shows the
contribution of shocks to 6-month-ahead unemployment rate expectations
for the unemployment rate and inﬂation in the baseline 4-variable and 6-
variable system. In the ﬁrst two columns of the table, we report the 1-year-
ahead and 5-year-ahead forecast error variance contributions for both the
Livingston Survey and SPF VARs. The range of estimated contributions of
expectations shocks to the forecast error variance of the actual unemployment
15rate is wide. In part, this variation is due to the fact that observations on the
expectations measures, and thus the VARs, start at diﬀerent dates. Clearly,
though, the table indicates that shocks to expectations are important for
economic ﬂuctuations. At the one-year horizon, these shocks account for
more than 35 percent of the forecast error of the unemployment rate. While
the contribution falls at the 5-year horizon, it remains substantial. These
results are broadly in line with the ﬁndings of Beaudry and Portier (2006),
who use VARs, and those of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2008), who estimate
a structurel model, in that expectations shocks account for more than 50
percent of aggregate ﬂuctuations.
We also ﬁnd that shocks to expectations are important for the forecast
error variance of the inﬂation rate, although that contribution is smaller than
for the unemployment rate. For instance, Table 1 indicates that the 1-year-
ahead contributions range from 4 to 20 percent. This range is about the
same for the 5-year-ahead contributions.
We also consider how well the variables in the VARs predict expected
unemployment rates. Granger-causality tests indicate that the variables in
both the 4-variable VAR and the 6-variable VAR Granger-cause the 6-month-
ahead expected unemployment rate. The P-values on all the tests were es-
sentially zero for the null hypothesis of no causality. We also examined how
much the variance of residuals from a regression of the expected unemploy-
ment rate on a constant and four of its own lags falls when we add inﬂation,
the unemployment rate, and short-term interest rate to the regression. We
ﬁnd that the variance of the residual drops on the order of 30 to 40 percent
for the Livingston Survey measure and for the SPF measure of expectations,
16respectively. If the set of regressors includes long-term interest rates and eq-
uity returns, the variance of the residual falls 43 percent for the SPF measure
of expectations, and 52 percent for the Livingston Survey measure of expec-
tations (the baseline remains a regression of the expected unemployment rate
on itself only). Consequently, we are conﬁdent that the variables in our VARs
are capturing important information forecasters use when making projections
of the unemployment rate. 8
4.2 Discussion
G i v e nt h a tw ee m p h a s i z et h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea sam e a s u r eo fr e a la c -
tivity in the empirical analysis, a natural framework with which to interpret
the ﬁndings is a Mortenssen-Pissarides style labor search model. Den Haan
and Kaltenbrunner (2009) use such a model to study the impact of posi-
tive news about future productivity growth on the business cycle and argued
that, because of the matching friction central to these frameworks, such news
c a nl e a dt oc o - m o v e m e n t si nm a c r ov a r i a b l e st h a tr e s e m b l et y p i c a lb u s i n e s s
cycles. As a result of the matching friction, ﬁrms post more vacancies in
anticipation of better times ahead, which increases today’s employment rate
and lowers the number of unemployed workers. Our results are consistent
8Because the unemployment rate tends to be very persistent, movements in the ex-
pected unemployment rate may be capturing the past more than future movements in the
unemployment rate. To mitigate this concern, we also considered an alternative version of
our baseline model with the actual and expected unemployment rates in ﬁrst diﬀerence.
In response to a sudden fall in expected unemployment, the results continue to show a fall
in the actual unemployment rate and a rise in inﬂation and interest rates. To preserve
space, we did not include the ﬁg u r e ,b u tt h er e s u l t sa r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
17with this model’s predictions: expectations of a downward movement in the
unemployment rate leads to an immediate drop in the unemployment rate,
and thus a pickup in economic activity.9
The responses of the short-term interest rate and the inﬂation rate to
expectations shocks that we uncover with our VAR analysis is also in line
with a simple monetary version of the labor search model. Expectations
of better times ahead would lead to an increase in current demand, which
would push marginal costs upward, resulting in higher prices and a rise in the
inﬂation rate. Assuming that the central bank follows an interest-rate rule
of the type estimated by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), the short-term
interest rate would rise as a result of both the higher inﬂation rate and a
positive output gap.
Of course, our model documents the average response of monetary poli-
cymakers to expectations shocks over the entire sample period. This is not to
say that in particular instances monetary policymakers may not have acted
more slowly than usual when tightening interest rates before the economy
heated up. Indeed, some commentators argue that the low inﬂation rates in
the United States during the late 1990s and during the housing-market boom
kept policymakers from raising interest rates in a proactive manner to stem
incipient booms (see Taylor (2008)). On balance, though, our results point
to a tighter monetary policy following waves of optimism.
9As already mentioned, our analysis does not identify speciﬁc factors that map into
expectation shocks. As a result, although the results suggest that expectations of better
times ahead lead to a current rise in economic activity, the identiﬁcation scheme doesn’t
necessarily ascribe this eﬀect to revisions in expectations of future productivity growth,
as is the case in the work of Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009).
185 Robustness Checks
5.1 Additional Measure of Real Activity
To provide more evidence of the eﬀect of an innovation to the expected
unemployment rate on real economic activity, we introduced another measure
of real activity to the empirical model. Since we use unrevised, or real-
time, data in the VAR, the options for real variables are limited. We use
the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) activity index as an additional
gauge of real activity. The ISM index is a composite index based on surveys
of purchasing managers in the manufacturing sector. An index value above
50 generally indicates the manufacturing sector is expanding, while an index
value below 50 indicates contraction. The index is not revised over time and
is widely believed to reﬂect future movements in real output.
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to an expectations shock when the
ISM index is ordered last in the VAR. (The ordering of the other variables
is the same as in Figure 4.) In response to a negative innovation in the
expected unemployment rate, the ISM index rises on impact and remains
signiﬁcantly above zero for about 6 months before exhibiting a hump-shaped
pattern that takes the index signiﬁcantly below zero for about 12 months,
which is consistent with a tighter monetary policy. On balance, though, the
ﬁnding that the ISM index rises in response to a positive innovation in the
expected unemployment rate is consistent with our ﬁnding that the current
unemployment rate falls. Note as well that the introduction of the ISM
in the SPF VAR leads to generally less signiﬁcant results in comparison to
the Livingston Survey VAR and to the other speciﬁcations. However, the
19qualitative pattern of the responses is similar to that of the aforesaid VARs.
5.2 Longer Horizon Forecast and Sample Size
We also consider how the results might change if forecasts of the future
unemployment rate were made for a longer horizon. The Livingston Survey
and SPF both have measures of expected unemployment 12 months ahead.
As can be seen in Figure 6, using 12-month-ahead expectations in the VARs
leads to virtually the same results as in the baseline that has 6-month-ahead
expectations. The story told by the VARs remains that expected good times
ahead lead to a current fall in the unemployment rate, an increase in inﬂation,
and a more restrictive monetary policy.
We also verify that the VAR results are stable over a sample period that
includes the current ﬁnancial crisis. We re-estimated the 6-variable VARs
over the period 1960M1-2009M4 for the Livingston Survey VAR and 1968Q1-
2009Q2 for the SPF VAR. The results are shown in Figure 7. Overall, ex-
tending the sample to include the current crisis has little eﬀect on the impulse
responses.
5.3 Measure of Households’ Expectations
To this point, the empirical results are conditioned on using measures of
unemployment expectations from surveys of professional forecasters. One
possible issue with the use of such surveys is that their coverage, in terms
of participants, is relatively small: the number of respondents in the LS
or in the SPF is typically on the order of 40 to 50. An additional issue,
noted, for example, in Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) is that professional
20and household forecasts can diﬀer quite substantially along some important
dimensions. For example, they ﬁnd that consumer forecasts of inﬂation tend
to be less eﬃcient than professional forecasts: forecast errors of consumers
are predictable based merely on past forecasts, while such is not the case for
professional forecasts.
To investigate the robustness of our results to an alternative measure of
survey expectations data, we re-ran our VARs using data from the Michigan
survey of households. The Michigan survey asks roughly 500 households
about their assessment of the economy and their expectations of a large
number of economic variables. One drawback of the survey, and an important
r e a s o nt h a tw ed i d n ’ tu s ei ti no u rb a s e l i n em o d e l ,i st h a ti ta s k sr e s p o n d e n t s
only whether they think the unemployment rate will go up, down, or stay
unchanged over the next 12 months.10 Contrary to the LS or the SPF, the
University of Michigan survey doesn’t ask respondents to provide a point
estimate for the unemployment rate.
Nevertheless, one measure of the survey tracks the changes in the unem-
ployment rate quite well: the diﬀerence between the percentage of households
who thought the unemployment rate would increase minus the percentage
who thought it would decline, normalized to 100. Figure 8 shows that this
measure tracks the broad movements in the unemployment rate and tends
to lead the changes in the actual unemployment rate. It appears then that
this measure of household expectations has informational content that can
10More speciﬁcally, the survey asks respondents the following question: “How about
people out of work during the coming 12 months – do you think that there will be more
unemployment than now, about the same, or less?”
21be used in our empirical models.
Figure 9 shows the results from our baseline and 6-variable models when
we use the Michigan survey of household expectations instead of the profes-
sional forecasts. Since the survey of consumers asks respondents about the
expected change in the unemployment rate over the next 12 month, we also
modify the VARs so that they include the yearly change in the actual un-
employment rate, rather than its level. The other variables in the VAR are
left unchanged. The survey of consumers has compiled quarterly data on ex-
pectations of unemployment changes since 1968, and at a monthly frequency
since 1978. We use the monthly data, since they allow us more ﬂexibility in
lining up the data to make the results more comparable to those with the
SPF. Since the response deadline for the SPF is generally the third week
of the second month of the quarter, we also use the survey of consumers
conducted in that month.
Qualitatively, using household expectations instead of professional fore-
casts makes little diﬀerence to the results. A sudden drop in expected un-
employment is followed by a drop in the actual unemployment rate, a rise in
inﬂation, and a tightening of monetary policy. In the 6-variable VAR, a down-
ward revision to expected unemployment also leads to an increase in stock
prices and long-term interest rates, just as was the case when expectations
of professional forecasters were used. Quantitatively, the variance decompo-
sition reported in Table 1 shows that whether we use households forecasts
or professional forecasts, the contribution of shocks to expectations for the
variance of the unemployment and the inﬂation rates is substantial. For ex-
ample, at the 5-year horizon, shocks to expected unemployment account for
22from 15 to 48 percent of the forecast error variance of unemployment. The
contribution to the forecast error variance of inﬂation is lower, at 3 to 17 per-
cent. In general, the results from the Michigan survey line up more closely
with the Livingston Survey than with the Survey of Professional Forecasters,
especially at the longer horizon. On balance, though, the results in Table 1
point to a signiﬁcant role for expectations shocks in accounting for variation
in inﬂation and unemployment.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Expectations play a key role in the determination of dynamic paths for eco-
nomic variables in cogent equilibrium models of the economy. While recent
applied theoretical work has suggested that expectations of future events,
events that are not part of current fundamentals, may play an important
role in economic ﬂuctuations, the empirical evidence on how important ex-
pectations are for business cycles remains somewhat sparse. Existing studies
have generally used economic data, such as asset price data, to infer expec-
tations about the future. In contrast, we have examined this issue using
actual expectations measures from surveys and used them to investigate how
unanticipated shifts in expectations can inﬂuence movements in economic
variables.
We ﬁnd that changes in expectations of future economic activity are a
quantitatively important driver of economic ﬂuctuations. An anticipation of
good times ahead leads to a fall in current unemployment, a rise in inﬂation,
and a tighter monetary policy. These impulse responses hold across a variety
23of expectations measures, from professional forecasters to households, and a
variety of VAR speciﬁcations. In this respect, our empirical evidence gen-
erally supports the ﬁndings of a recent generation of business cycle models
that imply that expectations of good times in the future lead to current-
period booms, rather than busts. Our results also suggest that during these
times of "economic optimism," the Federal Reserve tended not to run an
expansionary monetary policy that ampliﬁed ﬂuctuations.
With policymakers’ and market participants’ interests in survey data in-
creasing, existing surveys have expanded and new surveys have also been
introduced. For instance, since 1992 the SPF tracks expectations for 10-year-
ahead productivity once a year, while in 1999 the ECB introduced a survey of
European forecasters similar to the SPF. As enough data become available,
analyzing waves of optimism using these relatively newer data sources will
be an interesting avenue for future research
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Table 1.  Contribution of Expectation Shocks to the Variances of  
Unemployment and Inflation 
  LS SPF  Michigan 
Unemployment      
     
1-year ahead      
4-variable system  74.9  54.6  47.6 
6-variable system  79.1  36.5  41.2 
      
5-year ahead     
4-variable system  40.2  14.6  48.5 
6-variable system  47.2  11.1  30.7 
      
Inflation     
      
1-year ahead     
4-variable system  13.8  4.9  13.2 
6-variable system  12.6  2.2  13.0 
      
5-year ahead     
4-variable system  16.6  3.2  13.2 
6-variable system  13.1  3.3  11.5 
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23Figure 2. Responses to a Shock to Expected Unemployment 















































The responses were generated from a VAR with expected unemployment (EU), actual unemployment (U), inflation (PDOT), and the three-month T-Bill rate (R)
All the responses are expressed in percentage terms. The x-axis denotes years. In each chart, the darker area represents the 68% confidence interval, 
while the sum of the darker and lighter areas denote the 90% confidence interval.   The system with the LS survey is estimated over the period 























































12456Figure 3. Responses to a Shock to Expected Unemployment: Controlling 
for Oil and Fiscal Shocks















































The responses were generated from a VAR with expected unemployment (EU), actual unemployment (U), inflation (PDOT), and the 3-month T-Billt rate (R), an
for oil and fiscal shocks. All the responses are expressed in percentage terms. The x-axis denotes years. In each chart, the darker area represents the 68% co
while the sum of the darker and lighter areas denote the 90% confidence interval.   The system with the LS survey is estimated over the period 























































12456Figure 4. Responses to a Shock to Expected Unemployment: Larger System















































The responses were generated from a VAR with expected unemployment (EU), actual unemployment (U), inflation (PDOT), equity prices (Q), the 10-year T-Bill rate (LR),
and the 3-month T-Bill rate (R). All the responses are expressed in percentage terms. The x-axis denotes years. In each chart, the darker area 
represents the 68% confidence interval, while the sum of the darker and lighter areas denote the 90% confidence interval. 




























































12456Figure 5. Responses to a Shock to  Expected Inflation: Additional Activity Indicators 
















































The responses were generated from a VAR with expected unemployment (EU), actual unemployment (U), inflation (PDOT), equity prices (Q), 
the 10-year T-Bill rate, the 3-month T-Bill rate, and the ISM survey (ISM).  All the responses are expressed in percentage terms. 
The x-axis denotes years. In each chart, the darker area represents the 68% confidence interval, while the sum of the darker and lighter areas 
denote the 90% confidence interval.  The system with the LS survey is estimated over the period 1960M1-2007M4, while that using the SPF survey 


































































0.2Figure 6. Responses to a Shock to Expected Unemployment:
 Longer Horizon Forecasts











































The responses were generated from a VAR with expected unemployment (EU), actual unemployment (U), inflation (PDOT), and the 3-month T-Bill rate. 
All the responses are expressed in percentage terms. The x-axis denotes years. In each chart, the darker area represents the 68% confidence interval, 
while the sum of the darker and lighter areas denote the 90% confidence interval. The system with the LS survey is estimated over the period 


















































12456Figure 7. Responses to a Shock to Expected Unemployment (Extended sample)





















































The responses were generated from a VAR with expected unemployment (EU), actual unemployment (U), inflation (PDOT), equity prices (Q), the 10-year T-Bill rate (LR),
and the 3-month T-Bill rate (R). All the responses are expressed in percentage terms. The x-axis denotes years. In each chart, the darker area 
represents the 68% confidence interval, while the sum of the darker and lighter areas denote the 90% confidence interval. 





























































































































































































































































* 4‐quarter moving averageFigure 9. Responses to a Shock to Expected Unemployment: Michigan Survey










































The responses for the 4-variable system were generated from a VAR with expected unemployment (EU), the year-over-year change in unemployment (UDOT), 
inflation (PDOT), equity prices (Q), the 10-year T-Bill rate (LR), and the 3-month T-Bill rate (R). Equity prices (Q) and the 10-year T-Bill rate (LR) were added to 
those variables for the 6-variable system.  All the responses are expressed in percentage terms. The x-axis denotes years. In each chart, the darker area 
represents the 68% confidence interval, while the sum of the darker and lighter areas denote the 90% confidence interval. The systems were estimated over the 
period 1978Q1-2007Q2.
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